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求 金融危机英文介绍

How to Solve the Financial Crisis

The financial crisis deepens. The bailouts are piecemeal and national, whereas the crisis is global. What’s worse, the policy responses are not based on a clear diagnosis of the underlying problem.

Some politicians talk as if this crisis were merely about illiquidity: banks don’t have enough liquid assets to meet their current obligations. If this were so, the problem would already have been solved. The reason is that most countries have three institutions in place that generally prevent this sort of thing from happening: (1) central banks that are “lenders of last resort”, (2) depositors are insured (up to a specified maximum) and (3) banks are regulated and supervised.

But the problem now is different. Once we understand it, we are close to finding a solution. It is not just a matter of potential illiquidity, but also of potential insolvency: the total assets of many financial institutions could fall short of their total liabilities. At the current fire-sale asset prices, they’re in danger of going broke. The central banks can’t help here, since they lend only for short periods against highly-rated collateral.

The difficulty is that some of the troubled financial institutions are too large too fail (their demise would wipe out too much wealth, shut down too many businesses, throw too many people into unemployment) and are very contagious (their bankruptcy would lead to the bankruptcy of other large institutions). That is why we’ve seen lots of case-by-case bailouts (Bear Stearns, AIG, Fannie Mae und Freddi Mac, Fortis, Bradford and Bingley, Wachovia, Glitnir, etc.), climaxing in the largest, the Paulson plan.

什么是股灾

股灾（The Stock Market Crash）是股市灾害或股市灾难的简称。

它是指股市内在矛盾积累到一定程度时，由于受某个偶然因素影响，突然爆发的股价暴跌，从而引起社会经济巨大动荡，并造成巨大损失异常经济现象。

股灾不同于一般的股市波动，也有别于一般的股市风险。

股灾具有以下特点：

①突发性。

每次股灾，几乎都有一个突发性暴跌阶段。

②破坏性。

股灾毁灭的不是一个百万富翁、一家证券公司和一家银行，而是影响一个国家乃至世界的经济，使股市丧失所有的功能。一次股灾给人类造成的经济损失，远超过火灾、洪灾或强烈地震的经济损失，甚至不亚于一次世界大战的经济损失。

③联动性。

一是经济链条上的联动性，股灾会加剧金融、经济危机。

二是区域上的联动性，一些主要股市发性股灾，将会导致区域性或世界性股市暴跌。

④不确定性。

股灾表现为股票市值剧减，使注入股市的很大一部分资金化为乌有；股灾会加重经济衰退，工商企业倒闭破产，也间接波及银行，使银行不良资产增加；在股市国际化的国家和地区，股灾导致股市投资机会减少，会促使资金外流，引发货币贬值，也冲击着金融市场。

股灾原因：

股灾后很多人提出不同的理论，主要认为股灾成因包括：程式交易、股价过高、市场上流动资金不足 (illiquidity)和羊群心理。

股灾应对措施：

几乎每一个发生股灾的国家或地区都采取了善后处理措施。

应急措施主要有：

启用“断路器”暂停股市交易，动用股市平准基金入市，回购本公司股票，消除市场恐慌心理等。

为了避免股灾再次发生，则加快了证券市场法规建设与完善，强化了市场有效监管和规范运作，促进经济复苏和经济发展以重塑投资者信心。

illiquidity是什么意思

illiquidity

英 [ˌɪlɪ'kwɪdɪtɪ] 美 [ˌɪlɪ'kwɪdətɪ]

n.

非流动性

双语例句

1

This has accentuated market volatility and illiquidity.

这加剧了市场波动性，导致流动性愈发不足。

2

The result would be illiquidity in both the market for public debt and the banking system.

结果可能导致公债市场和银行系统都出现流动性匮乏。

我是一个初中生，需要一篇关于金融危机的纯英文演讲稿。请各位高人指点一下，请用英文！！！！

How to Solve the Financial Crisis

The financial crisis deepens. The bailouts are piecemeal and national, whereas the crisis is global. What’s worse, the policy responses are not based on a clear diagnosis of the underlying problem.

Some politicians talk as if this crisis were merely about illiquidity: banks don’t have enough liquid assets to meet their current obligations. If this were so, the problem would already have been solved. The reason is that most countries have three institutions in place that generally prevent this sort of thing from happening: (1) central banks that are “lenders of last resort”, (2) depositors are insured (up to a specified maximum) and (3) banks are regulated and supervised.

But the problem now is different. Once we understand it, we are close to finding a solution. It is not just a matter of potential illiquidity, but also of potential insolvency: the total assets of many financial institutions could fall short of their total liabilities. At the current fire-sale asset prices, they’re in danger of going broke. The central banks can’t help here, since they lend only for short periods against highly-rated collateral.

The difficulty is that some of the troubled financial institutions are too large too fail (their demise would wipe out too much wealth, shut down too many businesses, throw too many people into unemployment) and are very contagious (their bankruptcy would lead to the bankruptcy of other large institutions). That is why we’ve seen lots of case-by-case bailouts (Bear Stearns, AIG, Fannie Mae und Freddi Mac, Fortis, Bradford and Bingley, Wachovia, Glitnir, etc.), climaxing in the largest, the Paulson plan.

We know how we got into this mess. In very broad brush strokes, it happened like this: (a) Due explicit and implicit state guarantees to banks and their creditors, as well as a lamentable lack of associated regulation, banks faced low costs of risk. So, predictably, they invested in increasingly risky assets, such as subprime mortgage loans. (b) Due to low interest rates, banks faced low costs of borrowing. Thus they became highly leveraged. This meant that even a slight decline in their assets could destroy lots of their equity. (c) Like the regular banking sector, the “shadow banking sector” (money market funds, hedge funds, investment funds, private equity firms, suppliers of commercial paper, insurers such as AIG) funded its short-term liabilities with long-term assets, but the latter faced far less regulation. The result of “regulatory arbitrage,” moving risky business to where it is least regulated.

The rest is history: When the housing bubble burst, the value of mortgage-backed securities fell, and this left many financial institutions with too little capital relative to their debt. Thus they sold whatever assets they could (not just the mortgage-backed securities) and this drove asset prices down further, extending the problem to other financial institutions. With the exception of the Paulson plan, governments have responded to this crisis in a piecemeal fashion, deciding about one institution at a time (Bear Stearns yes, Lehman no). This raised investor uncertainty, leading to a general panic that spread to the money market funds.

If you agree that this is basically the problem, then a solution to this financial crisis is, in my judgment, could run along the following lines. Just as the problem of potential illiquidity can be addressed by “lenders of last resort” (the central banks), so the problem of potential insolvency can be tackled by “buyers of last resort.” The latter are the treasuries and finance ministries that can buy shares or warrants in the troubled financial institutions, thereby providing them with capital they have been lacking. Of course this capital infusion would have to come with additional regulation and supervision.

This sort of solution has been staring us in the face for some time. The broad idea was applied to the recent string of troubled institutions (Fannie and Freddie, AIG, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, Bradford and Bingley, Fortis, etc.). The U.S. government used it to get out of the savings-and-loans crisis of the early 1980s, as did the Swedish government to overcome its financial crisis of 1992. All we need to do now, in this world of global finance, is make it a reliable pillar of our global financial architecture.

Under my proposed solution, each government should establish a trust company that identifies the highly contagious (alias “systemically significant”) financial institutions which cannot be allowed to fail. These institutions receive a solvency insurance and, in return, become bound by new regulatory requirements. For example, the institutions could be required to retain a 10 percent stake in their securitized products and to publicize higher stakes they may hold. In addition, the trust company could require debt-for-equity swaps for institutions with excessively high leverage ratios. Thereby the institutions would reduce their liabilities relative to their assets, with the immediate expense shared by the shareholders and taxpayers. Finally, the trust company would have the duty to sell its stakes in these institutions within the next decade, with the sole objective of maximizing the taxpayers’ return.

Since both the regular and shadow banking sectors contain highly contagious financial institutions, both should receive comparable regulation and supervision. This is necessary to avoid regulatory arbitrage. But in this financially interdependent world, regulatory arbitrage is an international phenomenon. The only way to overcome it is through international coordination. As an important step in this direction, coordination among E.U. governments is essential. What is required is a harmonized institutional mechanism – through a central agency or a consortium of existing institutions – to coordinate and oversee the regulatory and supervisory activities of countries, monitor global financial risks, implement a globally integrated financial early warning system, and coordinate internationally the obligations of the buyers of last resort.

In the longer run, the world community should strive to perform these functions through a global monetary agency.

We can be under no illusions: providing solvency insurance is potentially dangerous, since the insured institutions have an almighty incentive to take excessive risks. This is the reason why the concomitant regulation and supervision, coordinated internationally, is so important. As it is, governments are bailing out one troubled institution after another, but often without the regulatory and supervisory safeguards. This creates serious problems for the future.

In short, the solution can be summarized in one sentence: Just as we have overcome the problem of potential systemic illiquidity through a lender of last resort plus deposit insurance regulation and supervision, so we must now overcome the problem of potential systemic insolvency through a buyer of last resort plus solvency insurance, debt-to-equity swaps, regulation and supervision.

This solution above requires courage, which is exactly what these dangerous times demand. The present financial crisis is truly global, requiring a globally coordinated response. Saving one financial institution at a time, each country for itself, can’t solve the problem. On the contrary, it would spread more uncertainty and fear, which would further undermine the global financial system. If we all had the assurance that a new world financial order was in place – that not only defended us from contagious illiquidity through lenders of last resort, but also protected us from contagious insolvency through buyers of last resort – then the widespread fear and distrust in financial markets would dissipate. Confidence could return and thereby the dangers of illiquidity and insolvency of the major financial institutions would recede. We all know that international cooperation is difficult. But as we look into the abyss, contemplating the possibility that the life savings of hundreds of millions could disappear as jobs and businesses are destroyed around the world, it should be clear to all major heads of state, all policy makers and voters, that we must grasp our responsibility to implement the required globally cooperative response.

哭求,如何解决金融危机 英文版

How to Solve the Financial Crisis

The financial crisis deepens. The bailouts are piecemeal and national, whereas the crisis is global. What’s worse, the policy responses are not based on a clear diagnosis of the underlying problem.

Some politicians talk as if this crisis were merely about illiquidity: banks don’t have enough liquid assets to meet their current obligations. If this were so, the problem would already have been solved. The reason is that most countries have three institutions in place that generally prevent this sort of thing from happening: (1) central banks that are “lenders of last resort”, (2) depositors are insured (up to a specified maximum) and (3) banks are regulated and supervised.

But the problem now is different. Once we understand it, we are close to finding a solution. It is not just a matter of potential illiquidity, but also of potential insolvency: the total assets of many financial institutions could fall short of their total liabilities. At the current fire-sale asset prices, they’re in danger of going broke. The central banks can’t help here, since they lend only for short periods against highly-rated collateral.

The difficulty is that some of the troubled financial institutions are too large too fail (their demise would wipe out too much wealth, shut down too many businesses, throw too many people into unemployment) and are very contagious (their bankruptcy would lead to the bankruptcy of other large institutions). That is why we’ve seen lots of case-by-case bailouts (Bear Stearns, AIG, Fannie Mae und Freddi Mac, Fortis, Bradford and Bingley, Wachovia, Glitnir, etc.), climaxing in the largest, the Paulson plan.

We know how we got into this mess. In very broad brush strokes, it happened like this: (a) Due explicit and implicit state guarantees to banks and their creditors, as well as a lamentable lack of associated regulation, banks faced low costs of risk. So, predictably, they invested in increasingly risky assets, such as subprime mortgage loans. (b) Due to low interest rates, banks faced low costs of borrowing. Thus they became highly leveraged. This meant that even a slight decline in their assets could destroy lots of their equity. (c) Like the regular banking sector, the “shadow banking sector” (money market funds, hedge funds, investment funds, private equity firms, suppliers of commercial paper, insurers such as AIG) funded its short-term liabilities with long-term assets, but the latter faced far less regulation. The result of “regulatory arbitrage,” moving risky business to where it is least regulated.

The rest is history: When the housing bubble burst, the value of mortgage-backed securities fell, and this left many financial institutions with too little capital relative to their debt. Thus they sold whatever assets they could (not just the mortgage-backed securities) and this drove asset prices down further, extending the problem to other financial institutions. With the exception of the Paulson plan, governments have responded to this crisis in a piecemeal fashion, deciding about one institution at a time (Bear Stearns yes, Lehman no). This raised investor uncertainty, leading to a general panic that spread to the money market funds.

If you agree that this is basically the problem, then a solution to this financial crisis is, in my judgment, could run along the following lines. Just as the problem of potential illiquidity can be addressed by “lenders of last resort” (the central banks), so the problem of potential insolvency can be tackled by “buyers of last resort.” The latter are the treasuries and finance ministries that can buy shares or warrants in the troubled financial institutions, thereby providing them with capital they have been lacking. Of course this capital infusion would have to come with additional regulation and supervision.

This sort of solution has been staring us in the face for some time. The broad idea was applied to the recent string of troubled institutions (Fannie and Freddie, AIG, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, Bradford and Bingley, Fortis, etc.). The U.S. government used it to get out of the savings-and-loans crisis of the early 1980s, as did the Swedish government to overcome its financial crisis of 1992. All we need to do now, in this world of global finance, is make it a reliable pillar of our global financial architecture.

Under my proposed solution, each government should establish a trust company that identifies the highly contagious (alias “systemically significant”) financial institutions which cannot be allowed to fail. These institutions receive a solvency insurance and, in return, become bound by new regulatory requirements. For example, the institutions could be required to retain a 10 percent stake in their securitized products and to publicize higher stakes they may hold. In addition, the trust company could require debt-for-equity swaps for institutions with excessively high leverage ratios. Thereby the institutions would reduce their liabilities relative to their assets, with the immediate expense shared by the shareholders and taxpayers. Finally, the trust company would have the duty to sell its stakes in these institutions within the next decade, with the sole objective of maximizing the taxpayers’ return.

Since both the regular and shadow banking sectors contain highly contagious financial institutions, both should receive comparable regulation and supervision. This is necessary to avoid regulatory arbitrage. But in this financially interdependent world, regulatory arbitrage is an international phenomenon. The only way to overcome it is through international coordination. As an important step in this direction, coordination among E.U. governments is essential. What is required is a harmonized institutional mechanism – through a central agency or a consortium of existing institutions – to coordinate and oversee the regulatory and supervisory activities of countries, monitor global financial risks, implement a globally integrated financial early warning system, and coordinate internationally the obligations of the buyers of last resort.

In the longer run, the world community should strive to perform these functions through a global monetary agency.

We can be under no illusions: providing solvency insurance is potentially dangerous, since the insured institutions have an almighty incentive to take excessive risks. This is the reason why the concomitant regulation and supervision, coordinated internationally, is so important. As it is, governments are bailing out one troubled institution after another, but often without the regulatory and supervisory safeguards. This creates serious problems for the future.

In short, the solution can be summarized in one sentence: Just as we have overcome the problem of potential systemic illiquidity through a lender of last resort plus deposit insurance regulation and supervision, so we must now overcome the problem of potential systemic insolvency through a buyer of last resort plus solvency insurance, debt-to-equity swaps, regulation and supervision.

This solution above requires courage, which is exactly what these dangerous times demand. The present financial crisis is truly global, requiring a globally coordinated response. Saving one financial institution at a time, each country for itself, can’t solve the problem. On the contrary, it would spread more uncertainty and fear, which would further undermine the global financial system. If we all had the assurance that a new world financial order was in place – that not only defended us from contagious illiquidity through lenders of last resort, but also protected us from contagious insolvency through buyers of last resort – then the widespread fear and distrust in financial markets would dissipate. Confidence could return and thereby the dangers of illiquidity and insolvency of the major financial institutions would recede. We all know that international cooperation is difficult. But as we look into the abyss, contemplating the possibility that the life savings of hundreds of millions could disappear as jobs and businesses are destroyed around the world, it should be clear to all major heads of state, all policy makers and voters, that we must grasp our responsibility to implement the required globally cooperative response.

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